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Farm Crop Energy v. Old National Bank: A
Meaningful Test For Damages Under
Promissory Estoppel?
I. INTRODUCTION
A 1984 Washington Appellate Court decision, Farm Crop
Energy v. Old National Bank,' provided the court with an
opportunity to resolve the confusion in promissory estoppel
law2 by announcing a workable standard for computing dam-
ages. The unique facts of the case, and the "appropriate cir-
cumstances' ' 3 test announced by the court increased, rather
than ended this confusion.
Old National Bank (ONB) and Farm Crop Energy had
entered a conditional loan agreement for the construction of a
fuel alcohol plant. Farm Crop subsequently advanced money
to the plant contractor, relying on the assurance of an ONB
officer that the loan would be made.4 ONB then refused to
make the loan, and Farm Crop brought suit on a number of
theories including promissory estoppel. The trial court granted
Farm Crop both their reliance costs and lost profits.5  On
1. Farm Crop Energy v. Old National Bank, 38 Wash. App. 50, 685 P.2d 1097, cert
granted, 103 Wash. 2d 1004 (1984).
2. Promissory estoppel is used as a basis of recovery in numerous situations and as
application of the doctrine expands into the commercial area, the issue of whether lost
profits should be awarded under the doctrine has proven to be very bothersome to
courts and commentators alike. See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text. For a
review of commercial cases involving promissory estoppel, see Metzger and Phillips,
The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 513-28 (1983) (discussing promises by employers and franchisors,
sub-contractor bid cases, credit-related promises, and various other "problems,"
"promises," and "situations"). Farm Crop is only the second reported opinion in
Washington to squarely address the issue of lost profits under promissory estoppel.
The first opinion was Silverdale Hotels v. Lomas & Nettleton, 36 Wash. App. 762, 677
P.2d 773, cert. denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1021 (1984) (denying an award of lost profits under
promissory estoppel). See also infra notes 24 and 52.
3. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57, 685 P.2d at 1102.
4. Id. at 52, 685 P.2d at 1100. See irfra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
5. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 52, 685 P.2d at 1102.
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appeal, the issue was whether lost profits were recoverable
under promissory estoppel.' The appellate court held that they
were in "appropriate circumstances."7
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the issues surround-
ing an award of lost profits under promissory estoppel and to
propose a method for determining when such an award is
appropriate. The Farm Crop court took a step in the right
direction by advocating a flexible approach to the damages
question in promissory estoppel cases. However, because of the
inherent ambiguity in the test and the failure of the court to
articulate any meaningful criteria on which to base a decision,
the "appropriate circumstances" standard provides neither gui-
dance nor justification for determining the appropriate mea-
sure of damages.'
This Note proposes that an award of lost profits under
promissory estoppel should be made only when the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the promise justify enforc-
ing it as if it were a contract. 9 Operating on the assumption
that a promise is found to be a reasonable basis for reliance,
this Note will propose some criteria by which a court can
determine when a promise justifies a damage award in excess
of the costs of reliance.' ° These criteria will then be applied to
the Farm Crop facts to demonstrate that remedies can be
administered under a standard that is rational and flexible, yet
provides reasonable certainty."
6. Id at 56, 685 P.2d at 1102.
7. Id at 57, 685 P.2d at 1102.
8. See infra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
10. This position is taken for the purposes of simplicity. There is authority for
granting other remedies, such as specific performance or injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Mazer v. Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So.2d 770, 772-75 (Ala. 1976) (enjoining violation of
restrictive covenant); McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 214,
235-40, 209 Cal. Rptr. 598, 612-15 (1984) (limiting estoppel to carrying out the exact
promise of confidentiality made by a grand jury, i.e., sealing records pertaining to one
witness); Larabee v. Booth, 463 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (granting specific
performance of promise to convey land); Christy v. Hoke, 127 Ariz. 169, 171, 618 P.2d
1095, 1096 (1980) (granting specific performance of an oral agreement to grant an
easement). However, it is generally required that there be an inadequate remedy at
law before equitable relief is granted. Accord Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Dep't of Revenue,
96 Wash. 2d 785, 638 P.2d 1213 (1982); Streater v. White, 26 Wash. App. 430, 613 P.2d
187 (1980). Thus, the majority of cases result in an award of monetary damages
because that is traditionally seen as adequately fulfilling the need for a remedy in
contract actions. The next logical step after determining that money damages are an
appropriate remedy is to determine what type of damages to award. See also injfra note
112-115 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 119-131 and accompanying text.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL DAMAGE
DISPUTE
Promissory estoppel was originally created to address the
problem of enforcing gratuitous promises,12 which under tradi-
tional contract principles were unenforceable because of a lack
of consideration.13 This situation frequently resulted in an
injustice because if the promisee undertook action in reliance
on a gratuitous promise there was no remedy available if the
promisor refused to perform. 4 Promissory estoppel was cre-
ated to enforce these promises on the basis of the promisee's
12. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); Henderson,
Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969)
[hereinafter Henderson, Promissory Estoppel]; Comment, Once More Into the Breach:
Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 559 (1970)
[hereinafter Into the Breach].
13. Consideration, in the form of a promise or performance being exchanged for
the promise, is the traditional cornerstone of contracts and is seen as the basis for
enforcing the contract: without it, a contract is generally unenforceable. "[I]t is the
essence of consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted
as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise must be made
and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the
consideration." 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 293 (1891); Wisconsin & Mich. Ry.
v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1983) (Holmes, J.); Accord Henderson, Promissory
Estoppel, supra note 12, at 345 (the classifications of responsibility that we have come
to regard as conventional, and which have been accorded black-letter status in the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, evidence a preoccupation with the belief that only
promises for which some agreed price has been paid are deserving of enforcement.
Thus, according to the catechism of consideration, action in reliance upon a promise is
sufficient reason for enforcement only when the action is bargained for by the
promisor and given in return by the promisee.). See also, Into the Breach, supra note
12, at 561; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
14. This was because the promise was not bargained for as defined by
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981) (a performance or return
promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and
is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise). The classic example of the
promisee being left without a remedy is Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 31 (1845) (plaintiff
abandoned possession of her land and moved onto her brother-in-law's farm in
reliance on his promise that he would provide her with a place to live. After two years
plaintiff was asked to leave the farm and was subsequently unsuccessful at recovering
damages in a suit based on reliance).
Prior to the creation of promissory estoppel, the courts often struggled with this
problem, frequently solving it by finding the promisee's reliance to be consideration
for the promise. See Depauw University v. Ankeny, 97 Wash. 451, 454, 166 P. 1148,
1149 (1917) (a subscription agreement to pay money to a charitable, benevolent, or
education institution is supported by consideration and is therefore enforceable if, in
reliance upon such agreement, an act has been done, money expended, or obligations
incurred). Cf. Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Olds Co., 84 Wash. 630, 632, 147 P. 406,
407 (1915) (if work has been done or expenditure has been made upon the faith of and
in reliance upon a subscription, a consideration is thus furnished to support the
promise).
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reliance. 5 One of the major issues concerning recovery under
promissory estoppel is whether the promisee is entitled to
recover expectation damages, or whether the promisee is lim-
ited to recovering the costs of reliance.' 6 The increasing use of
promissory estoppel in commercial cases has sharpened the
debate over how -recovery under the doctrine should be
limited.17
Courts and commentators have generally taken three
approaches to measuring damages in promissory estoppel cases:
the reliance measure, 8 the expectancy measure,' 9 and an ad-
hoc approach.2" Advocates of the reliance measure generally
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, comment a (1981) (allowing
recovery of damages based on reliance as an alternative to meeting the consideration
requirements of § 71(1) of the RESTATEMENT, which requires that performance or a
return promise be bargained for).
16. Interestingly, the first debate over the proper measure of damages occurred at
the Reporter's meeting for the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, with Professor Williston
advocating the expectancy measure and Professor Coudert advocating the reliance
measure. Their debate also provides an interesting example of when the reliance and
expectancy measures would not be equivalent in a gratuitous promise situation.
Suppose Johnny's uncle promises him $1000 to buy a car and Johnny relies by
purchasing a $500 car. Under the reliance measure Johnny would only be entitled to
$500, but under the expectancy measure, as Williston said himself, Johnny would be
entitled to the full $1000. 4 ALI Proceedings App. 97-106 (1926).
17. See generally Faber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel Contract Law
And the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CH. L. REV. 903 (1985) [hereinafter Faber,
Invisible Handshake]; Henderson, Promissory Estoppel, supra note 12; Note,
Promissory Estoppel in Washington, 55 WASH. L.REV. 795 (1980) [hereinafter Estoppel
in Washington]; Into the Breach, supra note 12, at 561-65.
18. This measure of damages attempts to put the promisee in as good a position as
he was before the promise was made by reimbursing him for his costs incurred in
reliance on the promise. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 2, 54 (1936) [hereinafter Fuller, The Reliance Interest]. See Goodman v.
Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (the true measure of damages is the loss sustained
by expenditures made in reliance upon the assurance of a dealer franchise); Wheeler v.
White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965) (the promisee is allowed to recover no more than
reliance damages measured by the detriment sustained).
19. This measure of damages attempts to put the promisee in as good a position as
he would have been had the promise been performed by giving him the value of the
expectation the promise created. Fuller, The Reliance Interest, supra note 18 at 54. See
Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1981); Signal Hill Aviation
Co. v. Stroppe, 96 Cal. App. 3d 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby,
51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123, reh'g denied, 144 A.2d 885 (1958). See generally Faber,
Invisible Handshake, supra note 17; Note, What Should Be The Extent Of Damages In
Pennsylvania In An Action Of Assumpsit Based On The Doctrine Of Promissory
Estoppel?, 59 DICK. L. REV. 163 (1955) [hereinafter Note, Pennsylvania Damages];
Note, Promissory Estoppel-Measure of Damages, 13 VAND. L. REV. 705 (1960)
[hereinafter Measure of Damages].
20. See Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. 50, 685 P.2d 1097; Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965); Into the Breach, supra note 12, at 559; and 1A A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 205, at 240 (1963). This, of course, assumes that the court finds
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argue that because a contract has not been formed and the pur-
pose of enforcing the promise is to prevent an injustice, the
promisee should not be permitted to recover more than the
cost of reliance." Advocates of the expectancy measure argue
that if the transaction is worthy of legal enforcement, then it is
economically desirable to enforce the expectation interest and
thereby encourage similar transactions.22 Finally, those who
advocate an ad-hoc approach argue that promissory estoppel is
an equitable remedy intended to prevent injustice and that
damages should be awarded based on the merits of the case.23
Washington has adopted an ad-hoc approach under the rubric
of "appropriate circumstances. '24  As will be seen, the Farm
Crop decision does not clearly explain what constitutes an
appropriate circumstance for an award of lost profits.25
III. THE FARM CROP FACTS
Farm Crop Energy, a Washington corporation, was formed
the promise to be binding. The court always has the option of doing nothing by finding
the promise to be non-binding.
21. This argument focuses on the intended purpose of promissory estoppel to
prevent injustice in situations in which a contract has not been properly formed. Since
there is not a full contractual agreement, the argument is that full contract damages
should not be available. Allowing such a recovery, it is argued, will be unjust to the
promisor and will discourage valuable negotiations and transactions. It is also argued
that, in many cases, expectation damages would be highly disproportionate to the costs
of reliance. See Boyer, Promissory Estoppel and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA.
L.REv. 459 (1950) [hereinafter Boyer, Limitations]; see generally Estoppel in
Washington, supra note 12.
22. Other arguments include the difficulty of measuring reliance, the fact that § 90
of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS is located in the chapter on formation of
contracts, and that promissory estoppel is an emerging basis of contract independent of
consideration. This was Professor Williston's position in the debates over the
forebearer to § 90. 4 ALI Proceedings App. 97-106 (1926). See also Faber, Invisible
Handshake, supra note 17; Into the Breach, supra note 12; Pennsylvania Damages,
supra note 19; Measure of Damages, supra note 19.
23. This is the position of the RESTATEMENT. Comment d provides that "the same
factors which bear on whether any relief should be granted also bear on the character
and extent of the remedy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, comment d
(1981). See also 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 205 (1964) (there is no reason why the
courts of the present day should not "make the remedy fit the crime" and make the
amount of a judgment for damages depend upon the special circumstances and the
merits of the claims of all existing claimants).
24. This was the result in Farm Crop and it could be argued that the Washington
Supreme Court implicitly recognized this when they denied certiorari in the case of
Silverdale Hotels v. Lomas & Nettleton, 36 Wash. App. 762, 677 P.2d 773, cert. denied,
101 W.2d 1021 (1984). In that case, the Court of Appeals based its denial of lost profits
not on any rule of law but rather on the fact that the promisor had not promised the
promisee any profits. Id. at 772, 677 P.2d at 790. See irnfra note 52.
25. See inkfra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
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in 1980 for the purpose of constructing and operating a fuel
alcohol plant in Washington. The investors in Farm Crop
approached ONB in February of 1981 intending to obtain a
loan for the construction of the plant.2" ONB issued a loan
commitment letter with a number of conditions attached.27 In
May of 1981, some of Farm Crop's officers met with Mr.
Danelo, an ONB officer, to discuss these conditions.2' At this
meeting, Farm Crop informed Mr. Danelo that substantial sav-
ings on the plant's construction could be had if $175,000 were
immediately advanced to Matrix Energy, the plant contrac-
tor.' Farm Crop's Officers contended that Mr. Danelo told
Farm Crop to go ahead and advance the money, because the
loan would be made.30 After Farm Crop advanced the money
to Matrix Energy, ONB announced that because Farm Crop
had not met the conditions, the bank would not make the
promised loan.3'
Farm Crop brought suit against ONB alleging promissory
estoppel as one basis of recovery.32 At trial, the jury returned
a verdict for Farm Crop and awarded $175,000 in reliance dam-
ages and $120,000 in lost profits.33 ONB appealed, contending,
among other things, that lost profits could not be recovered in
an action based on promissory estoppel.34  The Court of
26. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 52, 685 P.2d at 1099.
27. Included in the conditions were individual guarantees from each of the
investors, some limited and some unlimited, and a $500,000 loan guaranty from the
Small Business Administration (SBA). The SBA required unlimited guarantees from
all investors, contracts for raw materials, and contracts for the alcohol and spent grain.
Id.
28. Id
29. Id at 52, 685 P.2d at 1100.
30. There was some dispute at trial as to whether Mr. Danelo said the loan would
go through unconditionally or whether he indicated that the conditions still attached.
Id It might be asked at this point whether Farm Crop could reasonably believe that
the conditions did not attach after four months of negotiations and being fully aware
that the conditions had not been met. These factors could have some bearing on what
the parties reasonable expectations might have been when the assurances were made.
31. Id.
32. Farm Crop pleaded breach of contract, waiver, equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel. Id.
33. Id at 52, 685 P.2d at 1099.
34. Id. at 56, 685 P.2d at 1102. ONB was correct on this point because although
Washington courts had explicitly recognized promissory estoppel in Luther v. National
Bank of Commerce, 2 Wash. 2d 470, 484, 98 P.2d 667, 673 (1940) and also recognized
that it could serve as a basis for an action for damages, Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried
Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 255, 259, 616 P.2d 644, 646 (1980), no previous Washington
decision had allowed an award of lost profits under a clear case of promissory estoppel.
See Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wash. 2d 126, 443 P.2d 544 (1968)
(expectancy recovery, but not a true promissory estoppel decision as there was
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Appeals rejected this contention and held that lost profits
could be recovered under promissory estoppel in "appropriate
circumstances."35 The court reasoned that an award of lost
profits was appropriate because Farm Crop had lost its
opportunity.3 6
IV. THE COURT'S REASONING IN FARM CROP
The Court of Appeals recognized that two lines of analysis
could be applied to the Farm Crop case.37 The first begins with
the premise that the commitment letter from ONB created a
binding contractual agreement. 38 The court reasoned that the
jury could find Farm Crop had not met the conditions of the
letter.39 Thus, unless there had been a waiver of the conditions
or an equitable estoppel, Farm Crop would not be entitled to
performance."0 The court stated that ONB's May assurance
could be treated under either of these doctrines,4 ' but the
consideration for the defendant's promise). See also Luther, 2 Wash. 2d at 471, 98 P.2d
at 668 (expectancy recovery but as a contract had been formed, Luther is questionable
authority for promissory estoppel). See generally Estes v. Hammerstead, Inc., 8 Wash.
App. 22, 503 P.2d 1149 (1972) (reliance recovery); Hellbaum v. Burwell & Morford, 1
Wash. App. 694, 463 P.2d 225 (1969) (reliance relief). Cf. Estoppel in Washington,
supra note 17, at 814 n.103 (concluding that the few Washington decisions reaching the
issue of appropriate relief have split between the reliance and the expectancy
measure).
35. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57, 685 P.2d at 1102.
36. Id. There may have been other factors influencing the court's decision. See
infru notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
37. "Although it might have been preferable to treat this latter [May] assurance
under the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel, it is possible to treat it as a
separate promise. Thus, it was not error to instruct on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel." I& at 53, 685 P.2d at 1100. The two lines of analysis lead to entirely
different bases and theories of recovery. Under the waiver or equitable estoppel
analysis, recovery would be based on the commitment letter with Farm Crop being
excused from performance of the letter's conditions because of the May assurance.
Recovery on that basis would be on a contract theory. Under the promissory estoppel
analysis, recovery would be based on the May assurance alone. As the court correctly
noted, recovery under promissory estoppel could not be based on the commitment
letter because promissory estoppel is used to avoid injury when parties have failed to
properly form a contract. Id at 57, 685 P.2d at 1102. Promissory estoppel is an
equitable theory. See also notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 53, 685 P.2d at 1100.
39. Id. It appears from the record that not all of the investors had signed the
guarantees and no grain contract had been signed by Farm Crop. Not having met
these requirements, the investors also had not obtained the required SBA loan
guarantee.
40. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 53-54, 685 P.2d at 1100.
41. This is not to say that the outcome would have been favorable to Farm Crop if
the May assurance was treated under either of these doctrines. Aside from the
individual problems discussed below, recovery under either doctrine would depend on
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Court held that promissory estoppel also was applicable. 42
In its analysis, the court held that the May assurance met
the elements of promissory estoppel:
(1) A promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably
expect to cause the promisee to change his position (3) which
does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably
relying on the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.4
Therefore, although the jury could find that ONB was not
bound by the loan commitment," Farm Crop's reliance on
ONB's May assurance provided a proper basis for allowing
Farm Crop to recover under the doctrine of promissory estop-
a finding that the loan commitment letter constituted a binding contractual agreement.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known existing right. Wagner v.
Wagner, 95 Wash. 2d 94, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980). Theoretically, under a waiver analysis
the jury could have found that ONB had waived its right to demand performance of
the commitment letter's conditions and therefore ONB was liable for breach of
contract. However, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, if ONB was not yet entitled to
performance of the conditions when it made the May assurance, then the assurance
would not constitute a waiver of the conditions. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 54, 685
P.2d at 1100. Thus, although the parties agreed that waiver applied to the case, Farm
Crop still might not recover under a waiver theory because either the right to demand
performance had not yet matured and therefore, could not be waived in May or
because the commitment letter did not create a contractual agreement.
Equitable estoppel requires three elements:
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards
asserted; (2) an action by the other party on the faith of such admission,
statement, or act; (3) an injury to such other party from permitting the first
party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act.
Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 85 Wash. 2d 78, 81, 530 P.2d 298, 300 (1975). Under
an equitable estoppel analysis, ONB could be estopped from demanding performance
of the conditions because of the May assurance and therefore, be liable for breach of
contract based on their subsequent revocation of the commitment letter. However, it
must again be emphasized that this type of theory would provide Farm Crop with a
recovery only if the commitment letter was found by the jury to be a contractual
agreement.
The possibility of the jury finding that the commitment letter did not create a con-
tractual agreement appears to be what necessitated an instruction on promissory estop-
pel. If the jury were to so find, neither equitable estoppel nor waiver would provide a
remedy because they are defensive doctrines and do not in themselves provide an
affirmative basis for relief. Promissory estoppel, on the other hand, could provide a
grounds for recovery based on the May assurance alone.
42. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 53, 685 P.2d at 1100. This assumes that the
contractual analysis of waiver or equitable estoppel would be inapplicable, for if it
were, then recovery would be on the commitment letter (contract) and not on the May
assurance. See infra note 41.
43. Id at 52, 685 P.2d at 1100 (citing Corbit v. J. I. Case Co., 70 Wash. 2d 522, 539,
424 P.2d 290, 300-301 (1967)).
44. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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pel.45 Holding ONB liable on the basis of the May assurance
rather than on the loan commitment significantly altered the
measure of damages. Under the first line of analysis, recovery
would be based on the parties' original contract,46 whereas
recovery under the second line of analysis is based solely on
the May assurance.47
The court then analyzed the proper measure of damages
under promissory estoppel.41 The court cited a number of judi-
cial and scholarly authorities and determined that the general
rule was to fashion an equitable remedy.49 Having decided to
fashion an equitable remedy, the court determined that equity
called for an award to Farm Crop of not only their reliance
expenditures but also their lost profits.'0 The reason proffered
was that, "[p]resumably, Farm Crop and ONB anticipated a
profitable venture. In relying on the loan commitment from
ONB, Farm Crop did not seek alternative financing for its ven-
ture. Not only did it lose its money advanced, it lost its oppor-
tunity.""1 The court concluded by holding that these were
"appropriate circumstances" 52  for an award of lost profits,
45. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 53, 685 P.2d at 1100.
46. Id. at 53-54, 685 P.2d at 1100. If recovery were on a contractual basis, Farm
Crop would be entitled to all the normal contract damages including expectation
damages. There would be no need for a debate as to whether they were entitled to lost
profits as a matter of substantive law.
47. Id. This takes the case out of a contractual analysis and raises the issue as to
whether Farm Crop is entitled to recover the same damages under promissory
estoppel they would have if recovery had been on the contract.
48. Id. at 56, 685 P.2d at 1102.
49. Id. The court noted that the cases differed as to an award of lost profits.
Compare Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (denying lost profits); Fretz
Const. Co. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 626 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1981) (denying lost profits);
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965) (denying lost
profits); with Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123, reh'g denied, 144
A.2d 885 (1958) (awarding lost profits); Kramer v. Alpine Vly. Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d
417, 321 N.W. 2d 293 (1982) (awarding lost profits). The court cited the following
authorities as specifically supporting a flexible approach: Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
26 Wis. 2d at 695, 133 N.W.2d at 276; 1A A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 205, at 240 (1963); J.
CALAMARi & J. PERILLo, CoNTRACTS § § 6-12 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTis § 90 and comment d (1981) (The remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires).
50. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57, 685 P.2d at 1102.
51. Id.
52. The appropriate circumstances language derives from the court's attempt to
distinguish the situation in Farm Crop from that in a recent Division Two opinion.
Silverdale Hotels v. Lomas & Nettleton, 36 Wash. App. 762, 677 P.2d 773 (1984). In
Silverdale, a construction lender had promised to cover a contractor's construction
draws. When the lender refused to pay the draws unless the borrower deposited
$1,200,000 with the lender, the contractor sued for the draws and lost profits based on
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there was adequate proof of the lost profits,53 and that the trial
court did not err in submitting the issue to the jury.'
The court's reasoning that Farm Crop had lost its opportu-
nity is worthy of further inquiry because it is unclear what the
court meant by lost opportunity. While it is clear that Farm
Crop had lost the opportunity to get a loan from ONB, it is not
so clear that this prevented them from entering the fuel alco-
hol business.5 That the court did not question Farm Crop's
promissory estoppel. The court held that the contractor was not entitled to lost profits
because the lender had only promised to pay the contractor's draws and had not
promised to pay any profits. Id. at 772, 677 P.2d at 780. The court held in Farm Crop
that Silverdale was not to be read as prohibiting an award of lost profits under
promissory estoppel in appropriate circumstances. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57,
685 P.2d at 1102.
53. Id. at 57-58, 685 P.2d at 1102-1103. The court cites Larsen v. Walton Plywood
Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 390 P.2d 677, 686 modified on reh'g, 65 Wash. 2d 21, 396 P.2d 879
(1964), as providing the test for lost profits. Under Larsen, lost profits are recoverable
when they are (1) within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was
made, (2) the proximate result of the defendant's breach, and (3) proven with
reasonable certainty. At this point, it may be asked whether lost profits were proven
with the requisite certainty, an issue not otherwise dealt with in this Note. Farm Crop
was a new business and the ordinary rule is that a new business may not recover
prospective profits because they are inherently speculative. Larsen, 65 Wash. 2d at 16,
390 P.2d at 687. However, in Washington an expert may testify as to the market
conditions and profitability of similar businesses and thereby provide a basis for
calculating prospective profits of a new business. Id. Oddly enough, Farm Crop's own
expert, the owner of Matrix Energy and future co-operator of Farm Crop's plant,
testified that his own plant had been losing money. In addition, other fuel alcohol
plants had been financial disasters. Despite this evidence, the court concluded that lost
profits had been proven with the requisite certainty. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57,
685 P.2d at 1102.
54. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 53, 685 P.2d at 1101.
55. If the court means simply that Farm Crop lost the opportunity to enter the
fuel alcohol business then it is supporting an award of lost profits on a very superficial
analysis. Aside from the problems of causation discussed in the text accompanying
this footnote, the court's rationale would support an award of lost profits in almost any
action brought by a promisor. By nature, any refusal to perform results is the loss of
an opportunity. However, the loss of an opportunity has never been considered a
sufficient basis alone to support an award of lost profits. See infra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text.
If the court means that Farm Crop suffered an opportunity cost by entering the
transaction with ONB, the court is undoubtedly correct. However, by moving from
that point straight to an award of lost profits, the court overlooks many of the reasons
for awarding lost profits in cases where a party has incurred an opportunity cost.
Such reasons may call for different results under promissory estoppel than they do
under contract. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
56. Specifically, it is not clear that Farm Crop could not have obtained a loan
elsewhere and continued its endeavor to enter the fuel alcohol business. Assuming
arguendo that it was proper for the court to award damages beyond the costs of
reliance, it is not clear why the court did not address the issue of mitigation of
damages, a normal requirement in a contract action for damages. See 5 A. CoRBIN,
CoNTRAcTs § 1039 (1964) (since the purpose of the rule governing damages is to put
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failure to obtain another loan indicates that the ONB loan was
Farm Crop's only opportunity. This could be one explanation
of why the court believed the lost opportunity argument alone
justified an award of lost profits.57
A second possible explanation is that the court felt ONB
should be held to the consequences of its bargaining tactics.
Although the loan agreement was an arm's length transaction,
it is clear from the facts that ONB controlled the terms. Dur-
ing the four months prior to the May assurance, Farm Crop
expended considerable time and effort in meeting ONB's
demands.5 By relying on ONB's May assurance, the Farm
Crop investors committed themselves both to construction of
the plant and to ONB as a lender. The court may have felt
ONB was at fault for assuring that the loan would go through
in light of the parties' prior conduct and the reliance induced
by the assurance.59 Thus, the court may have perceived the
award of lost profits as a way to punish the bank and deter
them from inducing reliance on behalf of borrowers. If this
was the purpose the court had in mind, then the award of lost
profits was clearly inappropriate. Punishment has never been
regarded as a desirable or proper remedial goal of contract
law.6
0
the injured party in as good a position as he would have been put by full performance
of the contract, the plaintiff is unable to recover for losses that he could have avoided
by reasonable effort.). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981) (damages
are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have reasonably avoided
without undue risk, burden or humiliation). This rule is applied in Washington. See
Westland Const. Co. v. Chris Berg, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 824, 837, 215 P.2d 683, 691 (1953)
(one who has suffered because of the breach of a contract by another has a duty to
make a reasonable effort to mitigate his damages). In a lending case, this would
require the borrower to seek out a substitute loan and then to sue for his costs
incurred in obtaining the substitute loan. Such damages would be measured by the
excess of the costs and interest rate of the new loan over those of the old loan.
Alternatively, damages could be measured by the difference between the market rate
at the time of breach and the original agreement's rate. Theoretically, this would
enable the borrower to continue in his endeavor, and only if it is impossible for him to
do so should the court award lost profits.
57. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57, 685 P.2d at 1102.
58. Farm Crop had changed plant contractors at ONB's request, was in the process
of obtaining the SBA loan guaranty and the inputs and outputs contracts required by
the SBA loan guaranty, and a majority of the investors had agreed to the personal
guarantees. See Record at 56, 57, 99, 100, 1091-94, Farm Crop.
59. The court may have felt that ONB was not exercising ordinary care when it
made the assurance. It would not necessarily be error to base a holding on this factor.
The RESTATEMENT § 90 recognizes fault because the promise is enforced to the extent
necessary to avoid injustice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
60. The punishment would have to be covert, of course, due to the contract rule
against awards of punitive damages. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964) (it can
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FARM CROP DECISION
Certainly one of a court's primary concerns in making the
decision should be what kind of behavior the decision will
encourage in the future for parties in similar situations. 1
While it is good policy to discourage banks from making
promises that are unlikely to be fulfilled, the result in Farm
Crop may have the effect of discouraging economically desira-
ble transactions. Presumably, there are situations in which it
would be advantageous to the promisee to make payments to
third parties prior to final approval of a loan. 2 Of course, the
promisee is not going to make an advance of this nature with-
out some kind of assurance from the bank that he is not risk-
ing the loss of his advancement if the loan is not made.6 3
Ordinarily, a bank would not make such an assurance, but a
bank might be willing to do so in special circumstances.'
In light of the Farm Crop decision, banks will be unwilling
to make such assurances, regardless of the circumstances,
because banks will see potentially prohibitive liability flowing
from such promises.65 In Farm Crop, the liability beyond reli-
be laid down as a general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of
contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (punitive damages are
not recoverable for a breach of contract). See also Lincor Contractors v. Hyskell, 39
Wash. App. 317, 320, 692 P.2d 903, 906 (1984) (the purpose of awarding damages for
breach of contract is to [not] penalize the defendant).
61. Fuller and Perdue recognized this principle when they said Nietzsche's
observation that the most common stupidity is in forgetting what one is trying to do
has special applicability to the legal profession. Fuller, The Reliance Interest, supra
note 18, at 54.
62. Farm Crop is a prime example of this. Although it was not clear what the
savings would have been from the $175,000 advance, it is reasonable to assume they
were substantial. Otherwise, Farm Crop would not have gone through the trouble of
raising capital to make the advance.
63. This too is exemplified by Farm Crop because it is extremely doubtful that
ONB would have made the May assurance had it thought it could end up liable for lost
profits if it later refused to make the loan.
64. Such circumstances may include situations where the bank forsees nothing in
its control that would prevent it from making the loan, such as an undisclosed bad
credit history or an unexpected failure of a borrower to satisfy lending conditions.
Another situation would be where the proposed advancement is relatively
insignificant. Finally, banks may be willing to advance where the advancement would
somehow benefit the bank, such as by increasing the value of the bank's security
interest in collateral. For example, by allowing the bank to take a purchase money
security interest in fixtures which has priority over a subsequently recorded
construction lien under WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9 (1986), as opposed to an ordinary
security interest in fixtures which does not have priority over a construction lien.
65. Lost profits can run as high as hundreds of millions of dollars depending on
the type of business, the size of investment and various other factors. Unlike reliance
expenditures, which are generally small and controllable to some degree by the
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ance was only $120,000,1 but it is not difficult to imagine a case
in which the lost profits would be significantly higher. Addi-
tionally, liability for lost profits is likely to be highly dispro-
portionate to the expenditures made in reliance on the
promise.67 Therefore, banks will be unlikely to make this type
of assurance and many opportunities to save resources will be
unnecessarily foregone. Protection of the reliance interest, on
the other hand, would discourage most of these types of assur-
ances, but would still allow banks the option of making assur-
ances based on their own assessment of the potential costs.
68
This would be more efficient than protection of the expecta-
tion interest 69  while still deterring banks from making
promises they only marginally intend to fulfill.70
VI. THE PROBLEMS IN THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Assuming the court correctly concluded that ONB should
be held liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel based
on the May assurance, several problems arise from the court's
analysis of the appropriate remedy. The first of these
problems is whether it is appropriate to attribute Farm Crop's
lost profits to ONB's refusal to perform.7' A second question is
whether the showing of lost opportunity should be the single
requirement necessary to support an award of lost profits on a
non-contractual theory of recovery. 72 Finally, the court pays
little heed to what the parties may have contemplated at the
promisor, there is no predicting what lost profits may be and the promisor has no way
of controlling their amount. It is unlikely that banks will be willing to underwrite
reliance expenditures knowing they will be liable for lost profits, but not knowing the
amount of the lost profits or how to limit them.
66. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 53, 685 P.2d at 1099 ($295,000 (award) - $175,000
(reliance) = $120,000 attributable to lost profits).
67. Indeed, some commentators have advocated that this be a factor to be
considered in determining whether to award lost profits. See Into the Breach, supra
note 12, at 564 n.35; Expanded Application of Promissory Estoppel in Restatement of
Contracts, Section 90, 65 MICH. L. REV. 351, 356 (1966).
68. In this situation, the bank presumably would look at the benefits of the
advance, the amount of reliance the loan will induce, and the likelihood that the loan
will be made. See infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
69. See inkfra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
71. This raises the issue of causation. Assuming that ONB's failure to perform
caused Farm Crop to lose its opportunity, it is appropriate to say in light of all the
circumstances that it caused the loss of profits.
72. This addresses one of the unintended consequences of the Farm Crop decision.
In the opinion, the court seems to support a per se type of liability that would attach
any time a finding of lost opportunity is made.
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time the May assurance was made or to what their expecta-
tions were in light of the already existing commitment letter.73
The causation issue is a key point in the analysis. In other
commercial cases using promissory estoppel as the basis of
recovery, lost profits are awarded on the rationale that they
are a direct result of the breach.74  That analysis fails in the
instant case.75 Implicit in a finding that profits were lost as a
direct result of the breach is a finding that there was some
close relationship between the representation 6 and the lost
profits.77 In the franchise and firm offer cases, profits are the
sole purpose for the representation being made. As a result,
they are the primary factor in guiding the promisee's decision
to rely on a representation. 78 When the promisor fails to per-
form, the promisee has lost that which induced him to rely on
the representation, the profits he would have enjoyed by hav-
ing the promisor perform.79
When this analysis is applied to a loan case, a number of
73. In light of the fundamental theory underlying contract law (the theory that
the courts should enforce the agreement as the parties would have at the time the
promise was made), such an oversight is a serious one. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 344 comment a, for the proposition that "The law of contract remedies
implements the policy in favor of allowing individuals to order their own affairs by
making legally enforceable promises".
74. See Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1981) (lost
profits awarded because plaintiff suffered a loss of profits as a result of plaintiffs'
reliance upon the defendant's promise); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 277, 144
A.2d 123, 134, reargument denied, 144 A.2d 885 (1958) (loss of three months profits
direct result of breach); Gerson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 117 Ill. App. 3d
309, 312, 453 N.E.2d 726, 728 (1983) (finding promisees entitled to lost profits when they
have suffered lost profits as a direct result of the reliance on the promise).
75. See Bixler v. First Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 49 Or. App. 195, 200, 619 P.2d 895, 899
(1980) (plaintiff failed to prove lost profits with sufficient particularity); Wheeler v.
White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Tex. 1966) (loan case where court refused to award lost
profits under promissory estoppel).
76. Hereinafter, a promise that justifies enforcement under promissory estoppel
will be referred to as a "representation" to avoid any confusion with a promise that is
enforceable as a contract.
77. That is, profits are usually what induce the reliance on the representation and
are usually a point of bargaining between the parties.
78. For an example of promissory estoppel in a subcontractor bid case, see Gerson,
117 Ill. App. 3d at 312, 453 N.E.2d at 728. For examples in precontractual franchise
negotiations, see also Walters, 642 F.2d at 1100-01 (allowing recovery of lost profits);
Walker v. KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp. 612, 616 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (allowing recovery);
Chrysler, 51 Del. at 277, 144 A.2d at 134 (allowing recovery of lost profits). Contra
Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (denying lost profits); Klinke v.
Famous Recipe Fried Chicken Co., 94 Wash. 2d 255, 259, 616 P.2d 644, 646 (1980)
(denying lost profits); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wisc. 2d 683, 692, 133 N.W.2d 267,
274 (1965) (denying lost profits).
79. See Into the Breach, supra note 16, at 567.
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problems arise. Because the bank represents only that it will
make a loan, the connection between profits and the represen-
tation is more tenuous than in other commercial cases. There
are four reasons for this. First, in a lending transaction the
borrower is bargaining for the use of money and the lender is
bargaining for the profit gained by allowing the borrower to
use his money. The purpose of the loan ordinarily is to invest
in capital goods, and therefore is only indirectly related to
profits.8 0 Second, profits would be the same regardless of the
lender and it is doubtful that profits are a factor in the bor-
rower's determination to rely."' Third, because banks do not
make representations as to profits, the borrower would not
consider that a factor in selecting between potential lenders.,2
Finally, in most commercial situations, the representation is
likely to be the culmination of the parties' bargaining process,
whereas in lending cases the representation is probably collat-
eral to the parties' primary bargaining.8 3 Thus, the connection
between the representation and profits is not as close in loan
cases as it is in some other commercial cases.
Another major problem with the court's analysis is its con-
clusion that a lost opportunity justifies an award of lost prof-
its.8 4  In so concluding, the court implies that the benefits
foregone in entering the agreement are equal to the benefits
80. That is, although the parties bargain for a loan they do not bargain over what
profits the loan will generate. The borrower bargains for the use of the lender's
money so he can invest in assets that will generate income. Obviously, if the borrower
cannot generate profits it is unlikely that he would borrow the money. However, the
borrower's profit motive makes no difference to the lender as the lender bargains only
for the highest rate of return on the loaned money. The lender gets that rate of return
regardless of whether the loan generates any profits for the borrower or not. Thus,
profits are only incidentally related to the transaction.
81. This is because of the fungible nature of a bank loan. The bank makes the
loan because it feels it will make a profit off the interest charged on the loan; as long
as the borrower can meet the payment schedule, the bank is indifferent to whether it
makes a profit or not. When the borrower seeks the money to finance his venture, his
profits depend more on factors extrinsic to the bank loan than on the loan itself. This
is because the law assumes the same legal interest rate may be obtained elsewhere.
82. See supra note 81.
83. That is, the parties will usually have some kind of agreement as to when and
under what conditions the loan is to be made. The borrower then comes in and tells
the lender he can save money by advancing money to the contractor or seller before
the loan closes, as was done in Farm Crop. This type of promise, which is made
outside the context of the parties' negotiations (yet forms a basis for liability), is not
the same as a promise that culminates the parties' bargaining, but is unenforceable
due to a technicality such as the statute of frauds. The latter situation frequently
occurs in franchise cases. See infra note 94.
84. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57, 685 P.2d at 1102.
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that would accrue to the promisee by entering the agreement,
and for that reason alone, lost profits should be awarded. But
by its nature, a foregone opportunity is inferior to the alterna-
tive selected and presumably would yield a smaller amount of
profits."5 If that is the case, then the profits under the second
opportunity should be calculated and awarded as damages. As
some commentators have pointed out, however, this type of
calculation is so difficult, and the difference between it and the
expectancy interest is normally so small, that the expectancy
interest is awarded as a matter of expediency.8 Thus, the
promisee who is allowed to realize more than the value of his
lost opportunity fares considerably better than a plaintiff in a
traditional action who must generally show more than lost
opportunity to recover lost profits.17 Generally, the promisee
should be required to show that there was a mutually benefi-
cial exchange and that it would be economically beneficial to
award lost profits.8 8
A third problem with the court's analysis is its finding that
lost profits were in the contemplation of the parties.8 9
Although it is probable that lost profits were in the contem-
plation of Farm Crop, it is not as clear that lost profits were in
the contemplation of ONB.9 0 The fact that ONB asked for a
number of personal guarantees and other collateral at the time
of the original agreement implies that ONB was not as
impressed with the potential profitability of the plant as the
Farm Crop investors were. Additionally, as pointed out earlier,
85. See Into the Breach, supra note 12, at 568.
86. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) (where the
court applied this formula to a subcontractor bid case). See also Into the Breach, supra
note 12, at 568.
87. Aside from the factors below, there are the requirements of certainty,
forseeability, and mitigation. The court should not forget these points merely because
the court is applying promissory estoppel rather than contract principles.
88. This is a recognition that the bargaining process and the requirement of
consideration allows the parties to determine what rights and obligations are most
efficient as between them and to determine at the point of exchanging consideration
whether they want those rights and obligations to become permanently fixed. See
generally J. CALAMARI AND J. PERiLLO, CONTRAcTS § § 1-1 through 1-5 (1977); A.
KRONMAN AND R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-67 (1979).
89. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 58, 685 P.2d at 1103.
90. The doctrine is that lost profits are contemplated by both parties, not just one
party. The plurality takes on added significance in loan cases. See Larsen v. Walton
Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 390 P.2d 677, modified on rhng, 65 Wash. 2d 21, 396
P.2d 879 (1964) (test cited supra note 56). See also C. MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES § 25
(1935) (lost profits may be allowed as damages if in contract cases they were within the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made).
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profits were not a point of bargaining between the parties.
Finally, because the May assurance was collateral to the par-
ties' negotiations, it is doubtful that ONB anticipated being lia-
ble for lost profits based on the assurance alone. 91 Thus, it is
unlikely that ONB considered lost profits in its risk equation
when it made the assurance to Farm Crop.
The court's analysis in Farm Crop leaves much to be
desired. The ambiguous "appropriate circumstances" language
provides no guidance to businesspersons, litigants, or judges,
and can only lead to confusion. The effect of such confusion
ultimately will be to discourage a number of economically effi-
cient transactions that otherwise would occur if an understand-
able measure of damages were imposed under promissory
estoppel.92 Additionally, by limiting the analysis to a finding of
lost opportunity, the court ignores many of the purposes of
commercial law and the inherently flexible nature of promis-
sory estoppel.93 In some cases, the value of the doctrine con-
sists solely in the certainty of enforcing an otherwise
unenforceable promise and presumably expectation damages
would be the proper remedy.94 However, in other cases the
primary value of the doctrine is the flexibility it allows in the
creation and enforcement of unorthodox commercial transac-
tions.9' Any test for measuring damages under promissory
estoppel should be sensitive to both the need for certainty and
the need for flexibility.
VII. PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR MEASURING DAMAGES UNDER
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN THE FUTURE
The problem with the court's holding in Farm Crop lies
not in the recognition that remedies should be administered
91. See infra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
92. Parties are generally risk averse, even in situations of certainty, as is
illustrated by the amount of negotiating that goes into today's business transactions.
Uncertainty as to potential liability can only exacerbate that tendency.
93. The court specifically overlooks the interest in having the parties fully bargain
before reaching an agreement, the policy of allowing the parties autonomy, and the
general goal of completing the transaction in the fashion that the parties contemplated
when the agreement was made.
94. For example, in a franchise case where a contract had not been formed
because of a statute of frauds requirement. See generally Walters v. Marathon Oil Co.,
642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981).
95. Farm Crop is an example of this. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying
text.
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flexibly under promissory estoppel,96 but rather in the uncer-
tainty created by the sweeping appropriate circumstances lan-
guage. While the test for damages should allow flexibility, it
should also provide guideposts that provide some certainty.
The analysis should begin with the premise that if the prom-
isee is entitled to recover under promissory estoppel, he should
recover at least his expenditures made in reliance on the prom-
ise.97 From there, criteria should be provided that distinguish
promises that deserve enforcement beyond reliance from those
that do not.98 Because the action is contractual in nature, con-
siderations similar to those underlying contract damage awards
should be applied in promissory estoppel cases. Therefore, an
understanding of the considerations underlying the enforce-
ment of contracts is necessary to the development of a rational
theory of damages under promissory estoppel.99
A number of considerations underlying contract enforce-
ment deserve close attention when transferring the rationale
of enforcing expectation damages to promissory estoppel. The
bargaining process and the requirement of consideration pro-
vide the parties with a great deal of control over their agree-
ment and provide a method by which the parties can be certain
when their legal rights and obligations are fixed.' ° Thus,
when parties agree to contract they are aware of the entire
extent of their obligation. Another factor is the presumption
that in the normal contract situation, both parties have mutu-
ally maximized the value they expect to realize from the con-
tract through the bargaining process.10 Therefore, awarding
expectation damages provides both certainty as to performance
and economic efficiency between the parties and in the
market. 102
96. As stated before, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, (1981) comment
d recognizes this.
97. See supra note 10.
98. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
100. See Into the Breach, supra note 16, at 573-575.
101. A. POLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 25 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as POLINSKY] (parties would have included contract terms that
maximize their joint benefits net of their joint costs assuming they bargain costlessly
and cooperatively).
102. Expectation damages encourage efficiency in two ways. First, the possibility
of expectation damages encourages the parties to bargain to the point where neither
party could be better off under any other arrangement. Second, it discourages parties
from breaching their agreements unless they can realize a higher value in the
marketplace. If they can, then it is efficient to breach and pay expectation damages.
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Fuller and Purdue pointed out two primary rationales for
enforcing the expectation interest in contract actions in their
landmark article on damages. 0 3 First, enforcing the expecta-
tion interest is the most effective way of curing and preventing
the harms occasioned by reliance.'0 4 The expectancy measure
is more effective than the reliance measure because it is easier
to administer and more likely to fully compensate the prom-
isee, given the difficulty of proving the individual acts and for-
bearances caused by reliance on the contract.'0 5 Second, the
expectancy measure facilitates reliance on business agree-
ments, whereas the reliance measure would discourage this
because of the difficulty of proving reliance.'06 Presumably, if
the reliance measure were used, fewer contracts would be
entered into and there would be less willingness to act in reli-
ance on the contracts that were made.10 7
Consolidation of all these factors reveals three considera-
tions that underlie an award of expectation damages in a con-
tract action. One consideration is the appropriateness of
enforcing the parties' bargained agreement in the event of
breach.'0 8 Second, because the parties have gone through a
bargaining process, it is presumed that enforcement of the
expectation interest will promote economic efficiency.'0 9
Finally, by protecting the expectation interest, people are more
willing to enter contractual agreements because they know
they will not have to go through the difficulty of proving reli-
ance, and their expectations will be protected."0
In light of these considerations, the court should ask the
following three questions when analyzing whether a promise
in the context of promissory estoppel is deserving of protec-
tion beyond an award of reliance damages. First, the court
should ask if the parties went through a bargaining process,
with regard to the particular promise, that resulted in max-
imization of benefits."' If not, the expectation interest should
Only when a party knows what the damages will be can a party make this decision.
See POLINSKY, supra note 101, at 25.
103. Fuller, The Reliance Interest, supra note 18, at 52.
104. Id. at 62.
105. Id. at 60.
106. Id. at 62.
107. Id.
108. See Into the Breach, supra note 12, at 573-75.
109. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
110. See Fuller, The Reliance Interest, supra note 18, at 60-62.
111. The idea here is that the court should only enforce promises when the parties
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probably not be protected because it is not clear that both par-
ties maximized their value in the agreement. Second, the
court should ask what the parties reasonably could have con-
templated at the time the promise was made about the rights
and obligations they were to incur." 2 Finally, the court should
ask what effect an award of expectation damages would have
on parties in similar circumstances and whether that is the
result to which the parties would have agreed themselves."3
Utilizing the above.inquiries will provide a guided analysis for
determining whether expectation damages should be awarded.
If the parties reached the culmination of a bargaining process
when the promise was made and reasonably appeared to have
contemplated that they would be liable for expectation dam-
ages in the event of breach, then expectation damages should
be awarded unless such an award would discourage similar
transactions that otherwise would be entered into."4
While this analysis would require a number of factual
inquiries, such inquiries are no more burdensome to jurors
than asking them to determine whether a case presents appro-
priate circumstances for an award of lost profits with no fur-
ther guidance.1 5  The proposed analysis is advantageous
because it provides some certainty while still allowing for the
flexibility needed to give a remedy that approximates the obli-
gation the parties anticipated when the promise was made.
16
The advantage results because the court is forced to look at the
have gone through some degree of bargaining. Otherwise, the courts may end up
enforcing promises that do not maximize the mutual benefits to the parties, and
therefore would not be furthering the goal of economic efficiency. See supra note 101.
112. This encourages the court to go through the same cost-benefit analysis the
parties did at the time they entered the contract. If the cost of entering a contract is
equal to (the cost of performance times the probability of performance) plus (the cost
of breach times the probability of breach), then the expected damages play a
significant role in determining whether it is prudent to enter a contract.
Consequently, the court should be aware of what the parties perceived as the different
potential costs of the contract and on which measure of damages the parties based
their decision to enter the contract. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACT LAw 10-67.
113. This is the first part of the test proposed above. The rationale here is that the
court should only enforce commercially desirable promises as it is the purpose of
contract law to encourage socially desirable commercial transactions. See supra note
88.
114. The first clause of this sentence embodies the contractual analysis of
promissory estoppel and the need for certainty, while the second clause permits the
use of the inherently flexible nature of the doctrine.
115. This was the exact result of Farm Crop decision.
116. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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position of the parties when the promise was made and what
their expectations were at that time. Thus, the damage award
is more likely to approximate the obligations and rights the
parties felt they had when the promise was made, as opposed
to damages awarded based on the consequences of breach, as
was done in Farm Crop."7 This can be demonstrated by apply-
ing the proposed analysis to the Farm Crop facts. It should be
kept in mind, however, that the remedy is meant to be equita-
ble and that a finding of fault on the part of either party may
be determinative of the measure of damages.""
Under the proposed analysis the correct measure of dam-
ages in Farm Crop would be the reliance interest. The parties
had not gone through a bargaining process that had culminated
in the making of the promise.'19 Therefore, the parties had
probably not maximized the value they were receiving from
the transaction. Indeed, the fact that the parties had a prior
agreement that was different from the one being enforced indi-
cates that ONB had definitely not maximized its value.120
Therefore, enforcement of the expectation interest would not
necessarily promote efficiency in the marketplace or between
the parties.1
21
Another factor weighing against the award of expectation
damages is that the promise was not made in a bargaining con-
text.122 The promise was not a logical step in the parties' nego-
tiations, but rather was collateral to such negotiations.
Consequently, the parties had much less autonomy in deter-
mining what rights and obligations were being created, and
when they were fixed. In fact, ONB's liability was unknown
117. This is what the court is asserting when it says Farm Crop lost its
opportunity as a result of ONB's breach. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 57, 685 P.2d at
1102.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, (1981) Goodman, 169 F.2d at
685 (D.C. Cir., 1948). See also Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 692, 133 N.W.2d at 274. If either
party was not dealing in good faith it would probably be equitable to award damages
based on that fact alone.
119. The parties did not bargain as to the value of the promise to each party
thereby maximizing the efficient use of resources.
120. That is, ONB previously felt that a number of conditions were necessary for
them to realize their desired value at the time the original agreement was negotiated.
It is doubtful that the need for these conditions had dissipated between the time of the
February commitment and the May assurance, particularly in light of Farm Crop's
inability to fulfill the conditions. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 52, 685 P.2d at 1100.
121. This is because efficiency between the parties had not been achieved. See
supra note 102.
122. The assurance was made three months after the original agreement had been
negotiated. Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 52, 685 P.2d at 1100.
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until the court found the promise to be enforceable. 121 In light
of this, it is unlikely that the parties seriously contemplated
the full extent of their obligation at the time the promise was
made. Thus, enforcement of the expectation interest would be
inequitable because the parties were not clearly aware that
they were incurring such an obligation when the promise was
made.'24
On the other hand, the type of transaction that occurred in
Farm Crop is economically desirable to encourage.'25 How-
ever, expectation awards would actually discourage these
transactions because of the unpredictable potential for large
damage awards. 26 Conversely, reliance damages are relatively
easy to ascertain and control by the promisor. 127 Therefore,
lenders such as ONB would be more willing to make these
types of advances under a reliance measure because they
would be able to make a rational cost-benefit analysis. 28 Bor-
rowers, having sought out the advance, presumably would be
willing to accept the potentially lower damage award as a cost
of receiving an "unbargained" for benefit.'29 Thus, the pro-
posed test, unlike the Farm Crop analysis, would discourage
only those transactions in which either the cost of reliance or
the possibility of not making a loan were so high that the bank
felt the costs outweighed the benefits. 30 This result would
permit many more efficient transactions to occur than if the
remedy were an expectation award.
Therefore, under the proposed analysis, Farm Crop's
recovery should have been limited to their $175,000 reliance
expenditure. 3 ' This result is not only fair as between the par-
ties, but also has a limited effect of encouraging these types of
transaction. Although the result would not be the same in
every case, the flexibility of the proposed analysis does not
necessarily mean there is no certainty to the test. The focus of
the analysis is on definite factors that arise in nearly every
123. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
129. That is, borrowers in certain situations will be willing to forego recovery of
lost profits in the event the loan is made because they anticipate that the benefits from
the advance are worth the risk. See, e.g., supra note 101.
130. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
131. See Farm Crop, 38 Wash. App. at 52, 685 P.2d at 1100.
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commercial transaction. By looking at these factors closely,
business people can structure their transactions efficiently, and
courts can fashion remedies that are both equitable and effi-
cient in light of today's commercial realities. In any event, the
purposes of awarding damages will be more closely served
under the proposed analysis than they would be under the
appropriate circumstances test, which invites the trier of fact
to decide the question based on whim.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The measure of damages under promissory estoppel has
created numerous problems for courts ever since the creation
of the doctrine. The Farm Crop court is not the first to strug-
gle with the problem, and the court's endorsement of a flexible
approach indicates it is well aware of the problems of enforcing
this type of promise. However, the court's proposed test is so
ambiguous that it is meaningless. The court should have pro-
posed a test that requires courts to look at the commercial
realities of the situation and that would provide individuals
some guidance in structuring their relationships as they see
most beneficial. This Note has proposed some factors the court
should take into consideration when deciding what measure of
damages should be applied. The list is not intended to be
exhaustive. Rather, it is intended to convey the notion that the
court should focus on two things: The posture of the parties
when the promise was made, and the type of behavior the deci-
sion will encourage in the future.
Glen Andrew Anderson
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